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ABSTRACT
With the transfer of government shares in 17 electricity generation and
distribution companies in November 2013, Nigeria crossed the Rubicon in
the privatization process. This process began in earnest in 2003 with the
liberalization of the telecom sector as part of a strategic reform to improve
efficiency in these utility sectors. So far, privatization has not improved the
quality of service in these sectors. The problem has been traced to the failure
of regulation. The major problem is that the regulatory regime had not matured
before privatization. This immaturity manifests mostly in the failure to protect
consumer interests. This article reviews regulatory deficits post-privatization.
It assesses potential conflict between principles of market orthodoxy and
those of constitutional governance and argues for a rule-of-law approach to
regulation post-privatization that is focused on blending of promotion of
market efficiency and protection of fundamental rights.




In November 2013, Nigeria achieved a commendable feat of conducting
what is generally believed to be one of the largest single privatization
exercises in the world.1 The country handed over ownership of six
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1 The need for privatizing the electricity sector was originally articulated in the
National Electric Power Policy (NEPP) 2001 and later incorporated in the Electric
Power Sector Reform (EPSR) Act 2005.
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2 The six generating companies include two hydro stations that were sold as a
concession to private firms. Those are Kanji Hydro Plant Station and Shiroro
Hydro Plant Station.
3 The country’s transmission service provider – the Transmission Company of
Nigeria (TCN) was contracted in 2012 to the Manitoba Hydro of Canada for
managers preparatory to possible privatization. See Editorial,”Canadian firm
wins USD24m Nigerian power deal”Biztech Africa (5 April 2012) <http://
www.biztechafrica.com/article/canadian-firm-wins-usd24m-nigerian-power-
deal/2474/> accessed on Tuesday, 29 August 2017
4 The only exceptions are the 10 Nigerian Integrated Power Plants (NIPPs), which
are awaiting completion of the privatization and a few power plants owned by
some major oil companies in Nigeria.
5 See, generally, National Council on Privatization, National Electric Power Policy
(Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2001) for the policy thrusts of the electricity sector
reform in Nigeria.
6 See Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Reforming the Unreformable: Lessons from Nigeria
(MIT Press, 2012) 43-45 for a brief discussion of the liberalization of the telecom
sector and the privatization of NITEL and its mobile arm, MTEL.
electricity generation companies and 11 electricity distribution
companies to private firms.2 This followed on the heels of contracting
the country’s transmission service provider to private management
contractors.3 The two exercises almost completed the full privatization
of the entire electricity industry in Nigeria.4 The privatization of the
electricity industry is part of a larger economic reform programme of
the government, which started in 1999 with President Obasanjo. The
Obasanjo administration articulated the National Electric Power Policy
(NEPP) in 2000 and followed it up during his second tenure with the
enactment of the Electric Power Sector Reform (EPSR) Act, 2006. The
policy thrusts of the NEPP include liberalization of the electricity industry
by allowing licensing of independent power producers (IPPs), unbundling
of the vertically integrated utility service monopoly provider – the National
Electric Power Authority (NEPA), corporatization and commercialization
of the electricity value-chains and independent regulation of the entire
sector. As part of the independent regulation of the entire electricity
industry, the policy further restricts the Ministry of Power (or any other
nomenclature it may bear) to policy-making on electricity supply.5
The power sector reform follows after a largely successful reform
of the telecommunications sector in the late 1990s and early 2000.
That reform resulted in the licensing of private telecom firms to provide
mobile telephony services and later data services to Nigerian homes
and businesses. The later effort to privatize the publicly owned Nigerian
Telecommunication Limited (NITEL) was a huge failure.6 But the
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ultimate outcome of the reform is that today Nigerians are enjoying
mobile telephony services almost everywhere in the country. Nigeria is
today adjudged as the country with one of the fastest growing mobile
services and the most penetrated in the world.7 Although the quality
of mobile services Nigerians receive is very poor judging by the global
quality of service standards, many Nigerians continue to point to the
liberalization of the telecom sector as the few successes of the
government’s neoliberal economic reform programme. The success
consists in the fact that Nigerians moved from almost zero access to
telephony services to a situation where almost every household can
boast of ownership of a mobile phone and access to mobile phone
services. This success is attributed to the policy of liberalization and
commercialization of the telecom sector which was part of a
comprehensive infrastructure development plan of the Federal
Government starting from towards the end of military rule in the late
1990s.
Privatization began with the military administration of former Head
of State, General Ibrahim Babangida, as part of the conditionality for
the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) imposed on Nigeria and
similar fiscally troubled economies in sub-Saharan Africa in the late
1980s.8 Babangida began the reform with the Privatization and
Commercialization Act of 1988 as a regulatory framework.9 In 1993,
the government established the Technical Committee for Privatization
and Commercialization (TCPC) to coordinate the privatization and
commercialization activities of the military government. Later on, with
the return to civil rule in 1999, the government enacted the Public
Enterprises (Privatization and Commercialization) Act, which created
the National Council on Privatization (NCP) as the highest policy-
making organ of the government on privatization issues.10
The Act also created the Bureau for Public Enterprises (BPE) to
replace the TCPC as the technical operator and task manager of the
public enterprises reform policy of the government.11 As part of telecom
7 Ibid.
8 See Dickson Eyoh and Richard Sandbrook, “Pragmatic Neo-Liberalism and Just
Development in Africa” in Atul Kohli, Chung-in Moon, and Georg Sorensen
(eds), States, Market, and Just Growth (United Nation University, 2003), 227 for
general discussion of economic policy in Africa.
9 Privatization and Commercialization Act 1988, s. 3.
10 Public Enterprises (Privatization and Commercialization) Act 1999, s. 9.
11 ibid s. 12.
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12 The first licenses were issued in 2001. Later in 2003, a wholly Nigerian telecom
company, Glo, was licensed to provide mobile telephony services.
13 See Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala (n 6).
14 Paragraph 2.0 of NEPP, page 2.
15 Electric Power Sector Reform Act No. 6 2005.
reform programme, the government enacted the Nigerian
Communication Commission Act that created the Nigerian
Communication Commission (NCC) as the technical and economic
regulator of the telecom sector. NCC established a licensing regime
that resulted in the licensing of independent telecom operators like
the MTN, ECONET (now Airtel), and MTEL.12 As part of the reform
policy, the BPE failed in more than three attempts to sell NITEL and its
mobile arm – MTEL – to core investors until 2015 when MTEL was
successfully sold to a local consortium.13
It was the relative success in the reform of the telecom sector that
inspired the reform of the electricity sector. The NCP issued the NEPP
to offer policy direction for the electricity sector reform. NEPP’s policy
priority is “to create efficient market structures, within clear regulatory
frameworks, that encourage more competitive markets for electricity
generation and sales (marketing), which at the same time, are able to
attract private investors and ensure [an] economically sound
development of the system”.14The law followed it up with a structure
for the emergence of a competitive electricity market.15
First, it stipulates liberalization through licensing, unbundling of
the public monopoly utility, corporatization and commercialization of
the successor companies and, later in the transitional stage, privatization
of the now-corporatized successor companies. The law created a holding
company, the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN), which is
further separated into 18 different companies (6 electricity generation
companies, 11 distribution companies and a national transmission
company).
Towards the end of the transitional period, the law recommends
that the six generating companies and the 11 distribution companies
be sold to core investors as a way of guaranteeing a competitive
electricity market in Nigeria. The implementation of the electric reform
policy was stalled between 2007 and 2009 under President Yar’Adua.
In 2010 President Jonathan restarted implementation of the reform
with a Presidential Roadmap for Power Sector Reform. That strategy
document articulated the urgency to privatize the sector by focusing
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16 The Presidency, Federal Republic of Nigeria, Roadmap for Power Sector Reform
(A Customer-Driven Sector-Wide Plan to Achieve Stable Power Supply)
paragraph 1.0.
17 Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala (n 6), 43.
on removing “obstacles to private sector investment” and “clarifying
the government’s strategy on the divestiture of the PHCN successor
companies”.16 Thenceforth, the government made haste to privatize
the entire electricity sector – handling all the public assets to private
operators who have no proven track record in electricity generation
and distribution in Nigeria.
It ought to be noted that just as the first licenses for telecom
operators were issued shortly after the establishment of the NCC and
even before erecting a formidable framework for regulating the fast-
approaching privately managed telecom market, the privatization of
the electricity industry occurred before the regulatory regime for the
new electricity market has been fully established. The case of the
Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission – the regulator of the
electricity industry – is even more pathetic. The commission began
work in 2006 when the first set of commissioners was appointed. In
2009 those commissioners were forcefully removed from office, and
the Commission had no leader until December 2010 when President
Goodluck Jonathan appointed fresh commissioners to steer the
privatization of the sector. Clearly, by 2013 when private firms took
over the sector, the regulatory landscape of the electricity had not been
fully established.
The absence of maturation time in the regulatory landscape before
full-scale privatization has severe implications for the sector’s post-
privatization performance. Today, Nigerians continue to complain
bitterly about rampant service failures in both the telecom and
electricity sectors. Service failure in telecom is mitigated because of
the general euphoria with the availability of access to telecom services.
In 1999, NITEL could boast of only 45,000 landlines, but, by 2010,
thanks to the decade-long revolution in the mobile network, the number
had increased to 85 million.17 This dramatic increase does not deny
the universal poor quality of service in the country’s telecom sector.
Drop calls are so rampant in the country, and many Nigerians own
multiple mobile telephones in order to access service because of
incessant service failures. The cost of making calls in Nigeria is far
higher than in other places, and customer complaints are rife with
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18 “Power sector privatization has failed-Saraki” The Punch (10 January 2017)
<http://punchng.com/power-sector-privatisation-failed-saraki/> accessed 3
September 2017; Owede Agbajileke, “Privatization in power sector has failed –
Senate” Businessday (24 May 2017) <http://www.businessdayonline.com/
privatisation-power-sector-failed-senate/>accessed 3 September 2017.
19 Under the transitional arrangement in the power sector reform the distribution
segment of the electricity market is a monopoly where a licensed firm has
exclusive mandate to provide both distribution and resale to every customer on
that network. There is no other of electricity except the exclusive holder of the
distribution license. See Electric Power Sector Reform (EPSR) Act, s.67.
20 Stiglitz argues that privatization as part of the Washington Consensus proceeded
many accusing the NCC of regulatory capture, collusion and incapacity.
The electricity sector is worse because of the structural difficulties of
the electricity network. All indicators of service improvement – hours
of electricity supply, frequency and duration of outages, metering of
customers, billing accuracy and prompt response to complaints – are
all very parlous. Operators and regulators are agreed that the electricity
reform in Nigeria has failed to deliver on its promises. There are now
serious calls by some stakeholders to review and revise the privatization
of the sector.18
Part of the cause of service failure is corruption and the deliberate
manipulation of the market. Overpricing of services is one of the
complaints by consumers of both telecom and electricity. In the telecom
sector, the price is not strictly regulated, and competition amongst the
providers is expected to keep prices within the range of affordability.
This is dependent on the theory of a perfect market where information
is readily available, and cost of migration to cheaper service providers
is negligible. In reality, there could be collusion between providers
while customers remain unable to switch suppliers of telecom services.
In the electricity industry, many consumers are complaining of being
exploited by the distribution companies who do not provide reliable
and adequate electricity but issue exaggerated estimated bills. More
importantly, there is no choice of service provider as the Nigerian
electricity distribution is a private monopoly were customers are
captives of the distribution company with an exclusive franchise in a
defined territory.19
This article argues that the speed with which privatization was
completed without ensuring strong normative and legal frameworks
for a robust regulatory regime could mean that the notional gains of
privatization may become a chimera and may not even endure where
those gains are real.20 The regulatory landscape in Nigeria is even weaker
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on the fatal assumption that change of ownership without adequate provision of
regulatory institutions would result in efficiency and economic growth. This
ideological mindset resulted in gross failure in the transitional and developing
economies. See Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontent (Penguin Books
2002), 54-58.
21 Both the electricity regulator and the telecom regulator all have statutory
obligations to protect consumer welfare. See Nigerian Communication
Commission Act 2003, s.3(1) and Electric Power Sector Reform Act 2005, s. 32.
22 See Cass R. Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory
State (Harvard University Press 1990) for a robust discussion of how economic
theory and law intersect in market regulation.
because of the underdevelopment of the rule of law framework for
regulating a private sector utility market. Efficient and competitive
utility markets are built around certain disciplines that can be easily
described as the rule of law disciplines. This includes a strong code of
corporate conducts, pricing regimes that are transparent and accountable,
strong competition and antitrust regulations, technical and economic
regulation based on a substantive conception of justice. Unfortunately,
these do not exist in our regulatory landscape making consumer protection
and quick improvement in the quality of service extremely difficult.21
This article is divided into six sections. After this introduction, section
2 examines the regulatory landscape in Nigeria, its theoretical foundations
and the historical context of privatization. It zeros in on Nigeria’s preference
for sector-specific, rather than global, regulator. Section 3 explores the
general theoretical perspective of regulation, especially the economic
theory assumptions of a perfect market and cast this in the context of a
rule of law perspectives, especially in the context of Nigerian
constitutionalism. Section 4takes further the constitutional law critique
by arguing that beyond the ideal of promoting competition, separation of
power as a constitutional theory secures political accountability in
regulatory work. Section 5 focuses the conceptual evaluation of the
challenges of regulation on the imperative of promoting human rights,
especially in the regulator’s exercise of quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative
functions. Section 6 concludes the article by restating that the constitution
imposes a rule of law challenge on utility regulator in Nigeria.
2.  REGULATORY LANDSCAPE IN NIGERIAN
PRIVATIZATION
Regulation intersects the worlds of economic theory and constitutional
rights.22 Regulation can be conceived from two perspectives. The first
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23 ibid 2-5
24 Bernardo Bortolotti and Domenico Siniscalco, The Challenges of Privatization: An
International Analysis (OUP 2004) 110-111.
25 Tatyana P. Soubbotina, Beyond Economic Growth: An Introduction to Sustainable
Development (The World Bank 2004), 80.
26 The Nigerian National Assembly just passed a competition law in early this year.
The Act has not been signed by the President and, therefore, is yet to become
law. Editorial, “Senate Passes Federal Competition and Consumer Protection
Bill” Leadership (8 June 2017) <http://leadership.ng/2017/06/08/
%E2%80%8Esenate-passes-federal-competition-consumer-protection-bill/>
accessed 31 August 2017.
is the perspectives of simulating the ideal conditions necessary for the
gains of privatization to be realized. This, in essence, means the
conditions of a perfect market.23 In this sense, good regulation requires
the creation and sustenance of competition in the economy. This is
rather ironic because the impulse to privatize derives from the impulse
to deregulate. Governments that want to privatize begin by deregulating
the economy by relaxing their dominance in economic activities and
opening space for private firms to compete with government-owned
enterprises.
In another perspective, regulation is a means to protect the human
rights of citizens from the juggernaut of the market economy. Here the
regulator controls both the production and pricing of goods and services
to make them available and affordable to a broad category of citizens
and there are no other social or environmental costs of producing and
consuming such goods.24 This objective is well captured in a World
Bank publication thus: “… experience shows that privatization often
leads to increased tariffs unaffordable to poor households and
sometimes to outright exclusion of poor rural areas viewed as unprofitable
by private providers. Only pro-poor regulation, including subsidies for the
poor, can neutralize these drawbacks of private service delivery”.25 The
regulator, therefore, carries a burden to make sure that newly privatized
enterprises protect the rights of the people, especially the employment
rights of labour and the welfare of their consumers and client.
The Nigerian regulatory condition was not improved before
privatization begun in earnest. By the time Babangida began the
privatization programme as part of the IMF-imposed Structural
Adjustment Programme (SAP), Nigeria could not boast of strong
regulatory commissions and even the most rudimentary regulatory
regime for utility markets. There was no statute on competition even
till date.26 This is typical as Joseph Stiglitz suggests that privatization
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27 Joseph Stiglitz, “What is the Role of the State?” in Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey
D. Sachs & Joseph Stiglitz (eds.,) Escaping the Resource Curse (Columbia University
Press 2007) 39.
28 Karla Hoff and Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Modern Economic Theory and Development”
in Gerald Meier and Joseph Stiglitz (eds.) Frontiers of Development Economics:
The Future in Perspectives (OUP 2001) 419.
29 Electric Power Sector Reform Act 2006, s. 25.
often occurred before institutions of efficiency and fair control had
developed.27 The standard advice from privatization advocates, based
on the tragic experiences in Russia and other transition economies, is
that privatization should begin only after a strong regulatory regime
has been put in place.28 This is to avoid the kind of criminal asset-
stripping and crony capitalism that resulted in the former Soviet
republics.
There are two broad approaches to creating a regulatory regime.
The government may establish an omnibus regulator who takes charge
of privatized enterprises and regulates their performance or establish
industry-based agencies to regulate their respective industries. Nigeria
took the second option. Regulatory agencies were established to deal
with different industries. Some of these agencies were in existence
before some of the enterprises were privatized. For example, before
Nigeria liberalized the telecommunications sector and licensed private
telecom companies who carry GSM networks nationwide, the National
Communication Commission (NCC) had existed as a regulator. Also,
the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC) was established
in 2006, whereas the electricity industry was only privatized in 2013.
But these agencies could not establish the required regulatory regimes
before completing privatization. This was so evident in the case of
NERC, where many of the prescribed market structures that should
have preceded privatization, especially the development of a contract-
based trading, had not been established before assets were handed
over to the core investors.29
The problem with the Nigerian privatization exercise is the lack of
capacity of regulatory agencies to control the pricing and delivery of
services by the new private enterprises. This is very manifest in the
telecommunications sector where privatization has recorded its greatest
apparent success. Nigeria has licensed major GSM network companies,
including the MTN, V-MOBILE and GLOBACOM. By, industry estimation,
Nigeria is one of the fastest growing mobile phone users in the world.
The MTN records highest revenue in Nigeria than elsewhere, including
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30 Staff Writer 2, “MTN Settles Nigeria Fine & Looks at Listing at the Nigeria Stock
Exchange” African Business Central (11 June 2016) <http://www.african
businesscentral.com/2016/06/11/mtn-settles-nigeria-fine-looks-at-listing-on-
the-nigerian-stock-exchange/> accessed 31 August 2017.
31 Mayowa Tijani, “MTN Nigeria Revenue Jumps by 11.6% Despite Drop in
Customers.” The Cable (3 May 2017) <https://www.thecable.ng/mtn-nigeria-
revenue-jumps-11-6-despite-drop-customers> accessed 31 August 2017.
32 Mobolaji E. Aluko, “The Arithmetic of PMB, PSB and Interconnectivity:
Telecommunication Charges in Nigeria” (16 November 2003) <http://
www.jidaw.com/itsolutions/telecomm3.html> accessed 1 September 2017.
33 Nigerian Communication Commission, Nigeria Consumer Satisfaction Survey
Final Report (Final Report Part 2: Data Analysis, November 2012) 39-40.
South Africa, its headquarters and country of incorporation. MTN rakes
in one-third of its revenue from Nigeria alone.30 For example, MTN in
the first quarter of 2017 recorded over 17 per cent increase in total
revenue in spite of 2.3 per cent decline in customer subscription.31 In
spite of growing revenue to telecom companies, Nigeria records one of
the most expensive calls in the world. Before the advent of Glo Mobile,
per minute billing (PMB) was #50. The networks refused to introduce
per second billing (PSB) until Globacom launched its Glo Mobile on
per second billing. Even the regulator, NCC could not force the network
operators to migrate to per second billing till Glo through its market-
based strategies ushered per second billing which is more equitable
than per minute billing.32
It is not only high cost that is the problem with telecommunication
in Nigeria. The quality of services remains very poor. The rate of dropped
calls is very high. Many of the networks cannot sustain unbroken service
for a week. This has translated to a high cost of doing business for
both small and medium enterprises and big corporations in Nigeria.
An industry-wide study by an independent consultant reports massive
and pervasive bad services from all the networks. Some of the identified
poor services include the difficulty of connecting from one network to
another; the regularity of uncompleted calls, rapidity of dropping calls
by all the networks. The report states that about 48.8 per cent of
respondents experience loss of service sometimes and more than 50
per cent report drop calls from the networks.33
Why is the cost of a mobile phone call so expensive in Nigeria?
Some of the telecom operators explain that the problems are the lack
of infrastructural backbone for telecommunication in the country and
the high cost of doing business, including huge licensing fees. Although
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34 This is more so in the electricity sector where the design of the auction or
bidding process emphasized more of revenue earning rather than overall
economic efficiency. See Bernardo Bortolotti et al (n 24) 16-20 on the choice of
privatization method.
35 ACTON, “Why Nigerians Get Poor Telecoms Quality Service” <http://
technologytimes.ng/atcon-poor-telecoms-service-quality-nigeria/> accessed 6
September 2017.
the government liberalized the telecommunications sector by
dismantling the monopoly of the Nigerian Telecommunications
Company (NITEL) over the sector, it failed to increase infrastructural
development in the sector before the sale of frequencies to private
companies. Many years of inefficient monopoly and corrupt military
dictatorship had destroyed telecommunications infrastructure and
undermined development in the sector. What is required, and what
government failed to do was to invest more in developing a strong
backbone for telecommunication before privatization. The sunk costs
required in the sector are so huge that private investment may not be
forthcoming, or if it does, it will come with a great price for telecom
services. The counter-argument will be that the distress in the sector
was so overwhelming that quick and complete liberalization of the
sector were urgent and pressing. Private ownership will redound to
greater efficiency and more infrastructural development over time. So,
as the standard argument in the privatization debate goes, it is better
to privatize today and hope that efficiency gains arising from better
management practices will induce policy changes in the sector. This is
the so-called “shock therapy”.
The absence of infrastructure and good policy environment in the
electricity and telecommunications sector is partly caused by
government’s focus on revenue generation during privatization to the
detriment of productive and distributive efficiency.34 It seemed that
the liberalization of the telecom sector was necessitated more by fiscal
consideration rather than efficiency concern. The government
overcharged the operators for license and failed to invest the funds in
capacity building. The government should not have overtaxed telecom
operators. Overtaxing the operators reduces their financial capacity to
provide better services. In addition, lack of capacity in ancillary sectors
like the energy sector further weakened the capacity of the network
operators to maintain decent service for a long period of time.35
These problems do not suggest that it was wrong to liberalize the
telecom sector and privatize the electricity sector or that government
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36 By virtue of Section 1 of the Electric Power Sector Reform Act, 2005, the National
Electric Power Authority (NEPA) was transformed into a Power Holding Company
of Nigeria (PHCN) and further broken into 18 different companies, which are
collectively referred to as successor PHCN companies.
ought to have maintained the monopoly of Nigeria Telecommunications
Limited (NITEL) and the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA). To
a large extent, the government proceeded with caution in the telecom
sector. It did not immediately privatize NITEL. It began with
commercialization and management contract. But, it turned out that
both commercialization and management contract failed to turn-around
the affairs of NITEL. Later, there were multiple failed attempts to sell
NITEL and MTEL. Later in 2014, BPE managed to sell NITEL to a private
firm. The privatization of the successor companies of the Power Holding
Company of Nigeria (PHCN) was more orderly and successful.36 Building
up regulatory capacity is important for a successful privatization. From
the perspective of poverty alleviation and access to basic service by
the poor, the most important issue after privatization is the price of
the services post-privatization. In the Nigerian case, before
liberalization, access to telephone services – whether in terms of mobile
phones or landlines – is non-existent. So, comparatively, in spite of the
high cost of telephone services in Nigeria, the rationale for liberalizing
the sector is still strong, in spite of very poor service quality.
Another problem associated with regulating the telecom sector is
the extent of the power of the regulator over business practices. Very
early in the day, a big crisis developed between the NCC and the GSM
operators over the right of the former to issue new enforcement rules.
The telecom sector is under heavy tension arising from the dispute
between the Association of Licensed Telecommunication Operators
(ALTON) and the National Communication Commission (NCC) over
the power of the latter to regulate the sector in particular manners the
former deems either unconstitutional or inefficient. The NCC defends
its regulations on the ground of legislative mandate and the protection
of public interest and the telecommunication policy of the Obasanjo
government. In this altercation, there is so much hot air, but little clear
thinking. The combatants clash like armies by night.
The combatants largely overlook the intricacies arising from the
intersection of law and economics. In fact, telecommunication is one
of the business enterprises that task the scholarly resources of law and
economics most. Regrettably, this disciplinary approach to the study
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of law is not developed in Nigeria. As Nigeria integrates into the main
swell of the global economy and continues to engage in market reforms,
the law faculties must begin to train students who exercise proficiency
in issues of economic development, the rule of law and public policy.
This requires the overhauling of law school curriculum to give place to
“perspective courses”, that is, courses that merge together insights
from different areas of study to analyse a thematic discourse. In the
interim, the law journals and newspaper law papers should devote
more space to issues of economic reform and the rule of law.
3.  UNDERSTANDING THE RULE OF LAW APPROACH
TO POLICY AND REGULATION
The rule of law approach to regulation of any sector (whether telecom
or electricity) is not just a matter of understanding how the regulatory
law says the sector should be regulated. We must at least supplement
and interpret the provisions of the regulatory law with the provisions
of the constitution and principles of constitutional law. Let us illustrate
this with Section 70 of the NCC Act 2003. This section empowers the
NCC to issue rules and directives for telecom business in Nigeria. The
NCC has construed from this provision the power to make some
stringent enforcement regulations, which the operators find financially
onerous, legally burdensome and constitutionally suspicious. The rule
of law approach asks what the regulator, NCC in this case, can validly
do. How can it regulate business relationship between the operators
and the social relationship between the operator and the community?
The template for sketching the market and social responsibilities of
telecom operators in Nigeria requires knowledge of the fundamentals
of the rule of law as sanctioned by the constitution and applied in the
context of best business practices. We will examine hereunder some of
these fundamentals as they apply to the key features of the regulatory
environment.
3.1 The Rule of Law and Competition Policy
One of the basic policies defining the reform of telecom and electricity
markets in Nigeria and their effective regulation is the creation of a
competitive market for telecom services and products.37 Although
37 National Communication Commission Act, s…; Electric Sector Reform Act 2005,
s. 32.
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40 Ministry of Budget and National Planning, Economic Recovery and Growth Plan
2017-2020 (February 2017) Chapter 4.
41 bid 81.
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Nigeria is yet to have an operative competition law,38 there is a
competition policy as can be deduced from the many economic reform
programmes starting from the National Economic Empowerment and
Development Strategy (NEEDS)39 up to the current Economic Reform
and Growth Programme (ERGP).40 NEEDS wants the government to
stay away from key roles in businesses and intervene only when it
needs to correct failures in the free market (the founding document
does not use the exact words). It articulates an economy that is private-
sector-driven and geared towards both allocative and dynamic efficiency.
ERGP also marshalled strategies that would make “the Nigerian
business environment more competitive”.41
In the discourse of economic regulation, a competition policy
operates as a deregulation policy. Standard liberal economic theory
prescribes that efficiency is achieved when private actors voluntarily
enter into economic transactions in response to price signals. As the
US Supreme Court puts it, “competitive forces will yield the best
allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest
quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time
preserving an environment conducive to the preservation of our
democratic political and social institution”.42
A competition policy tries to establish the ideal-typical perfect
market when the cost of entry and exit is lowered and distortion is
reduced to the minimum. Because competition policy is inherently
deregulatory, competition law often focuses on de-emphasizing
regulatory behaviours that impose unnecessary transaction costs on
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business enterprises and discourage efficient allocation of resources
by market forces. To achieve the purposes of deregulating the economy
and allowing for free competition, the authorities must use competition
policy to encourage self-regulation after setting proper standards. The
essence of the free market economy is that economic behaviour follows
price signals, which reflect productive efficiency. Therefore, a prudent
regulator is advised, as much as possible, and in line with the
competition policy, to remove any regulatorydistortion of economic
activities. To this end, the focus should be to allow as much self-
regulation as possible as long as firms do not capture market power
unfairly and in a manner that frustrates the engendering of competitive
business environment that encourages more productive cost
economizing and increases consumer welfare.43
Obviously, the NCC, as a regulator, understands the overriding
importance of ensuring the realization of the deregulatory intent of
the competition policy of the Federal Government. But, the challenge
is how to execute this policy in the context of other responsibilities
outlined in the NCC Act and the constitution. As a regulator, NCC has
a public duty to ensure fair competition and protect customer welfare.
Section 4 of the Act outlines the following functions:
i. Regulating for fair and effective competition;
ii. Regulating to deal with market failures specific to
telecommunication sector;
iii. Regulating to deal with social inequities and other
distributional problems of social justice; and
iv. Regulating for greater micro-economic and social benefits in
the acquisition and use of telecommunication technology for
public benefits.44
These functions show that the act intends sectoral regulation in
addition to the deregulation of the economy pursuant to a competition
policy. The NCC will not be an effective regulator of the quality of
service and customer welfare if it does not properly mainstream its
regulatory work within the economy-wide deregulatory competition
policy. One of the problems faced by developing countries or countries
transiting to a full market economy is the difficulty of establishing the
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boundaries between deregulation and regulation, or better still, how
to regulate in a deregulating economy.
Some scholars in law and economics are of the view that once a
country subscribes to a competition policy, it should enact a
comprehensive and generic competition law and sectoral regulation
should be eliminated or reduced to the barest minimum. This is the
view of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). It argues,
“the trend today is towards deregulation. Some traditional forms of
telecommunication regulations are now viewed as having been more
damaging than beneficial to the development of the national
telecommunication infrastructure and services … regulation of
interconnection represents one of the small number[s] of exceptions
to the general rule. In most cases, regulation can and should be
minimized”.45 The World Bank handbook of telecommunication
regulation seems to support this view.46 But the study of international
best practices suggests that what adduces to abetter result is a creative
and intelligent mixture of competition law and well-targeted sectoral
regulation.47
The World Bank and ITU handbooks advocate for light-handed
regulation, something akin to deregulation.48 The debate in mainstream
law and economic discourse about the blending of generic competition
law and sectoral regulation pays no attention to issues of public law,
particularly constitutional law and the sub-genre of human rights law.
From a rule of law approach, what does the Nigerian Constitution say
about the extent of deregulation in key sectors of the national economy?
Do the fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy
in the Constitution allow for the sort of deregulation and self-regulation
that the operators demand, or do they impose on the government a
responsibility of more intrusive and extensive regulation?49
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Section 16 of the Constitution sets out the economic objectives
that should guide regulation, deregulation and reregulation as follows:
(1) The state shall, within the context of the ideals and objectives
for which provisions are made in this constitution; (a) harness the
resources of the nation and promote national prosperity and an
efficient, a dynamic and self-reliant economy; (b) control the
national economy in such manner as to secure the maximum
welfare, freedom and happiness of every citizen on the basis of
social justice and equality of status and opportunity (c) without
prejudice to its right to operate or participate in areas of the
economy, other than the major sectors of the economy, manage
and operate the major sectors of the economy;…50
From these provisions, there is clear constitutional authorization
for regulation of the telecom sector to achieve both efficiency and social
justice. The constitution requires an economy that is efficient but also
secures “the maximum welfare, freedom and happiness of every citizen
on the basis of social justice and equality of status and opportunity”.
What is the legal status of this directive principle? The courts have
held that these directive principles are not justiciable at the instant of
a person who alleges that his rights have been infringed by the acts of
government or another citizen.51 But, this does not mean that they are
divested of legal effect. These directives sought to guide executive
actions in Nigeria. Every branch of government ought to reflect these
directives in their policies and programmes, and where they fail to
incorporate them, or act contrary to their requirement, such actions
can be held as unconstitutional.
This is particularly so when another provision of the constitution
obligates a body or agency to follow any of the directives in its work,
for example, the Federal Character Commission that ought to ensure
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equity in public service of the federation. The Supreme Court has held
that although the fundamental objectives are themselves not
enforceable in court, where a law has enacted those obligations or
principles, they become enforceable in court against public officers
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Both the NCC and the NERC, as administrative agencies, belong to
the fourth branch of government. As US Supreme Court Justice Robert
H. Jackson stated in the classical case, FTC v. Ruberiod Co:53
The rise of administrative bodies probably has been the most
significant legal trend of the last century and perhaps more values
today are affected by their decisions than by those of all of the
court, review of administrative decisions apart. They also have
begun to have important consequences on personal rights…. They
have become a veritable fourth branch of government, which has
deranged our three branch legal theories as much as the concept
of a fourth dimension unsettles our three-dimension thinking.
As members of the fourth branch of government, these agencies
should be guided by constitutional obligations. Since the constitution
prescribes efficiency and social welfare as the directive principles of
management of economic resources in Nigeria, these regulatory agencies
have an obligation to blend competition policy and sectoral regulation
in the exercise of their mandate. In this wise, I consider hereunder
some of the criteria that ensure compliance with the constitution and
promotion of economic efficiency and a competitive market in
telecommunication. These criteria are legal as well as economic.
4.  SEPARATION OF POWER AND REGULATORY
ACCOUNTABILITY
Regulatory agencies, as members of the executive branch, are required
to observe the principles of separation of power. How do we conceive
separation in the regulatory regime? Separation of power is an
accountability framework in the exercise of regulatory powers.54 As
44 AFE BABALOLA UNIVERSITY:  J. OF SUST. DEV. LAW & POLICY VOL. 8: 2: 2017
David M. O’Brien, Constitutional Law and Politics: Struggles for Power and
Governmental Accountability (Volume One) (W.W. Norton 20000) 367-368.
55 Cass Sunstein (n 22) 74.
56 Both the Nigerian and US Supreme Court have invoked their judicial review
power to reinforce regulatory accountability. See Director of S.S.S. v Agbakoba
(1999) 3 NWLR (Pt.593)314 and Abbot Laboratories v. Gardiner 387 U.S. 136,
140-141 (1967).
Cass Sunstein wisely observes, when regulation fails, it might be the
failure of constitutional goals. It could be because of the “absence of
political deliberation or accountability”.55 In a nutshell, separation of
power requires that different branches of government do not encroach
on the functions allocated exclusively to the others. In the rendition of
legal philosophy, separation of power recognizes that political freedom
is protected if the body or person who makes the law differs from the
bodies that interpret and execute the law.
It is easy to determine that the principle of separation of power
has been violated when the executive performs a legislative function
or vice versa. But, it is not so easy when the violation is insidious and
discreet. Separation of power violation occurs as well when an executive
agency issues regulations and rules, which expand its powers beyond
what the legislature has authorized in the enabling act. The law clearly
requires that a subsidiary legislative or administrative direction based
on an enabling act does not exceed the parameters of the act. A
regulatory action that crosses such boundary would violate regulatory
accountability.56
Political accountability in the context of separation of power would
require that the regulatory agency fulfil its mandate denoted by an Act
of National Assembly. It cannot pursue economic orthodoxy to the
extent that it forgoes the constitutional requirement of blending
deregulation and sectoral regulation or forego clear mandate in the
Act. The doctrine of “regulatory forbearance”, as proposed by
economists, may be prudential but could amount to non-compliance
with the constitutional and legislative mandate.
It will also be a violation of the principle of separation of power
for NCC to interpret its power under the Act to require issuing directives
and regulations that go beyond the contemplation of the NCC Act.
This raises the issue about the degree of deference an administrative
agency should enjoy from judicial review. The NCC is the custodian of
the expertise required for the effective regulation of the sector. Therefore,
it rightly argues for powers to effectuate its legislative mandate. But
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the execution of its legislative mandate may violate rights guaranteed
by the constitution. Therefore, it is not enough to plead good faith and
expertise. The court should not defer to the agency’s interpretation
and application of its powers if such derogate from its legislative
mandate and undermines judicial functions.57
5.  PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL
HUMAN RIGHTS
Judicial review of the exercise of regulatory powers will also extend to
a determination whether agency’s interpretation or execution of powers
infringes guaranteed rights? This is where the protection of fundamental
rights becomes important. Sadly, many market reform advocates do
not consider the importance of protecting these rights. The result is
that the regulator is often thrown into avoidable legal crisis. The most
important rights in these instances are the rights to a fair hearing and
personal property. The case law on the right to fair hearing is well
developed in Nigeria as well as in other jurisdictions. The Supreme
Court in Stitch v. A.G. Federation laid a clear rule that even executive or
independent agencies created by Acts of Parliament, whenever they
are to make determinations that affect the rights of private or corporate
citizens, must comply strictly with fundamental rights, especially the
right to fair hearing under section 36 of the constitution.58
Important aspects of regulatory actions include rulemaking and
enforcement of sanctions for breach of rules. What duties do the right
to fair hearing impose on such regulators like the NCC and the NERC
when undertaking such regulatory actions? Primarily, it imposes the
duty of complying with procedural and substantive due process. The
power to seal off and detain equipment and facilities, to revoke licenses,
to request for basic information in respect of national interest, and
impose several administrative fines may pose troubles for the agency
because of possible violations of the fair hearing principle. The Supreme
Court in a long line of cases including (LPDC v Fawehinmi,59 Oyelade v.
Araoye,60 Alakija v. Medical Disciplinary Committee)61 has held that any
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determination that engages the public agency in acting judicial must
follow the full complement of a fair hearing.
The policy dilemma for the regulator is how to understand the
extent of the duty to act judicially, that is, to hear the other party and
not to be a judge in one’s case. How could the agency make rules,
investigate alleged infractions and impose fines in a manner that it
will not be guilty of violating fair hearing? Therefore, if the agency,
after a proper investigation, determines that the operator has violated
the code and imposes fines, it risks judicial nullification except it
properly shields itself from being a judge in its own case. This was the
issue in the Fawehinmi case where the Attorney-General who raised a
complaint of unprofessional conduct against Fawehinmi supervised
the process that disciplined him for unprofessional conduct. The
Supreme Court nullified the proceedings for want of due process.62
This poses the challenge of walking the tight-rope to achieve agency
mandate without undermining the duty to act judicially.
To act judicially and effectively achieve regulatory mandate in the
present market orthodoxy is a complex problem that will require a
comprehensive review of the principles and practices of administrative
law in Nigeria. This requires the enactment of composite administrative
law procedures like the US Administrative Procedure Act (APA).63 This
law will set out all the reviews standards for different kinds of agency
work. It will also set out a procedure for rule-making by the
administrative body. Therefore, when the agency intends to make a
directive or ruling of a technical nature, it will advertise to relevant
stakeholders, especially members of the epistemic community and the
business operators, and offer theman opportunity to challenge the
agency’s episteme and offer a different standard to regulate that aspect
of the industry. This composite law will also differentiate the kind of
rulings and directions that require full hearing from those that do not.
In the absence of such an administrative code support for regulatory
mindfulness, the regulatory landscape will remain incoherent.
6.  CONCLUSION
The purpose of privatization of key sectors like telecom and electricity
has been to ensure abetter quality of services through private sector
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efficient allocation and utilization of resources. The assumption that
the private sector would be more efficient than the public sector is
something of a standard doctrine of the liberal economic orthodoxy. It
is predicated on fundamental theorems of welfare economics, which
rests on falsifiable assumptions that (1) the market is perfectly
competitive; and (2) that there are no other costs (social and
environmental) that are integrated into the equilibrium prices. To
achieve the strategic objective of privatization, at least in the transitional
stage, government must regulate the activities of private firms in the
privatized industry.
Markets are never perfectively competitive and oftentimes produce
negative externalities either in the form of pollution or nuisance or in
the form of excluding people from access to basic services, thus making
regulation becomes inevitable.64 In the utility market, such exclusion
could be in the form of higher cost or insufficient coverage. But the
debate is not whether there should be regulation of private sector
managed infrastructure but how. The dominant neoliberal economics
has influenced the conception of regulation as merely dealing with
transaction costs in a manner that enhances the functioning of the
market, rather than in a manner that achieves other non-market goals.
As always, the when and how of privatization would depend on the
values and goals that one considers important.
The Nigerian Constitution has proclaimed such strategic values and
goals in the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State
Policy in chapter 2 and the Fundamental Human Rights in Chapter 4.
This imposes a rule of law approach to regulation. Such an approach
will not only cure market failure but go further to promote civil and
political rights as well as social and economic rights of Nigerian citizens
and residents.
